for short-term, reversible balance-of-payments deficits, thereby supporting their parities. The short-term nature of the swap mechanisms, however, suggested that the United States either did not recognize the fundamental natures of the problems confronting the Bretton Woods system, or expected foreign countries to make the necessary adjustments. This paper explains the Federal Reserve's swap operations during the Bretton Woods era. 2 The analysis is based on a unique data set consisting of all U.S. foreign-exchange operations between 1961 and 1973 and on Federal Reserve documents. 3 The exposition starts by describing Triffin's paradox-a fundamental problem of gold-exchange standards-and by illustrating how cross-rate adjustment problems and U.S. inflation aggravated the situation. The paper then explains the U.S. decision to intervene. U.S. intervention attempted to provide liquidity and confidence to the Bretton Woods system without interfering with-and, therefore, addressing shortcoming in-the more fundamental adjustment process. Using the Federal
Reserve's swap line with the Swiss National Bank, the paper illustrates how swaps provided cover against unwanted dollar reserves. Using the Federal Reserve's swap lines against the Bank of England, the narrative describes how swap lines provided temporary liquidity to deficit countries. It also touches on alternative uses of swaps and on the Federal Reserve's sterilization of such operations before explaining how the collapse of Bretton Woods created problems for the repayment of outstanding swaps. Throughout, the paper shows how swap operations successfully bought time for more fundamental adjustment, which then never came about. In this sense, the operations were ultimately a failure.
Triffin's Paradox
After the Second World War, the stock of gold and its global distribution could not adequately support the expanding volume of international trade and investment. The framers of Bretton Woods had set the official gold price at its pre-war value, but subsequent inflation drove the real price too low to induce a sufficient gold supply (Bordo 1993 , James 1996 , Meltzer 1991 . The United States subsequently provided the needed liquidity by running persistent balance-of-payments deficits. Triffin (1957 Triffin ( , 1960 recognized the paradox that this situation created: The very act of providing dollar liquidity threatened the viability of the Bretton Woods system, because once the stock of outstanding dollar liabilities exceeded the U.S. gold stockand this was inevitable-the official dollar price of gold would lose credibility. 4 Central banks would then have a strong incentive to run on the U.S. gold stock, if they had not already done so.
By 1960, outstanding dollar liabilities exceeded the U.S. gold stock ( figure 1 ). Yet, without adequate liquidity, the system could not function.
Two other factors aggravated Triffin's paradox: First, financial flows out of devaluationprone deficit countries-initially, for example, the United Kingdom and later France-plowed even more unwanted dollar reserves into surplus countries, notably Germany and Switzerland.
This happened because traders shifted from weak currencies to dollars and from dollars to strong currencies. These flows did not expand the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit, but they, nevertheless, placed the U.S. gold stock at risk. Foreign central banks managed the dollar-gold composition of their reserves-sometimes backed by legal requirements-and divested themselves of "excess" dollars for U.S. Treasury gold to eliminate their exposure to exchangerate risk. Another factor adding to the problem that Triffin described was inflation in the United 4 Triffin (1960) recommended creating a source of non-dollar international reserves through the IMF. The IMF first issued Special Drawing Rights in January 1970, but the issuance came too late. grid. Moreover, a dollar devaluation against gold would have no effect on the U.S. competitive position unless surplus countries revalued their currencies against the dollar. Alternatively, the United States could achieve a real dollar depreciation through deflation, but administration and Federal Reserve policy makers, who believed that U.S. economic activity remained below its potential in the early 1960s, were unwilling to dampen U.S. aggregate demand to such ends.
Instead, U.S. policy makers reacted in a manner suggesting that they expected foreign countries to accommodate their own currencies' real appreciations either by accepting higher inflation or by undertaking nominal revaluations. Consistent with this interpretation, the United States adopted a number of measures that did little more than by time; of these, exchange-market intervention became the most enduring.
Treasury Intervention
In (FOMC Minutes, 6 March 1962, p. 72) .
As many FOMC participants understood, intervention operations needed to tread a narrow and uncertain path between offsetting temporary and reversible market disruptions and interfering with more fundamental market adjustments. Intervention ideally might prevent a sudden, reversible loss of gold, but if it delayed or somehow prevented a necessary policy change, the demand for gold would only grow, confidence in the official gold price would deteriorate, and the ultimate adjustment could prove more disruptive than in the absence of intervention (FOMC Minutes, 13 September 1961, p. 55) . Moreover, prolonged interventions could undermine the willingness of private traders to make a market in foreign exchange (FOMC Minutes, 5 December 1961, p. 60) . 7 For these reasons, the FOMC favored operations aimed at safeguarding the value of the dollar and protecting U.S. gold reserves only from temporary market disturbances. They set up a mechanism for intervention-swaps-to reflect this approach. As time would tell, however, distinguishing between transitory and fundamental disequilibrium forces proved extremely difficult.
Swap Lines
From 1962 until the closing of the U.S. gold window in August 1971, the Federal
Reserve relied on swap transactions as its key mechanism for temporarily defending the U.S.
gold stock. In a typical swaps transaction, the Federal Reserve would sell U.S. dollars spot to a foreign central bank for that bank's currency and immediately sell that foreign currency back to the same central bank at a set future date and exchange rate. The repayment would terminate the drawing, but not the credit line. Central banks, in almost all cases, annually negotiated on a bilateral basis overall limits for their swap lines. Drawings initially had a term of three months, but could be renewed once, if both parties agreed. Ideally, banks were not to seek a second renewal, nor were they to continuously draw on a line for more than a year. Swap lines were 7 For some interesting parallels with developing countries and emerging market economies today, see CalanesKriljenko (2003 CalanesKriljenko ( , 2004 and Calanes-Kriljenko, et al (2003) . 8 The Treasury also maintained swap lines, typically on an ad hoc basis and often with developing countries to provide those countries with temporary loans. The Treasury's first swap line was with Mexico in 1936. reciprocal, meaning the either party to the arrangement could initiate a drawing. Hence, the Federal Reserve's swap lines quickly became important means through which foreign central banks could acquire financing for temporary balance-of-payments deficits.
Swap drawings incurred no exchange risk, because both the spot and forward legs of the transaction occurred at the same exchange rate. The bank that drew on the line to intervene, however, was exposed to exchange risk since it did not know the precise price of obtaining foreign exchange to retire its swap drawing. The likelihood that the debtor bank would face a sizable loss (or default), however, was miniscule. As long as the par value remained credible, the central bank that drew on the line tended to profit from the operation. The bank initiating the drawing sold the foreign exchange against its own currency when the latter was trading below par and bought the foreign exchange to repay the swap when its currency had appreciated (Bodner 1970, p.1) . Moreover, to protect the debtor central bank should the creditor central bank revalue its currency during the term of a swap, the lines included "revaluation clauses" that allowed the borrowing central bank to obtain sufficient foreign exchange from the creditor to repay its obligation at the exchange rate prevailing just prior to the revaluation. Because swaps were relatively safe, central banks did not apply conditions, such as the adoption of macroeconomic policies or the application for an IMF loan, to their use.
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In all cases, the central bank initiating a swap also paid interest on its borrowings. The creditor central bank invested the foreign currency that it acquired from the debtor central bank for the term of the swap in a time deposit or in some other interest-earning asset. (The debtor would do likewise with any unused balances.) During the Bretton Woods era, the interest rates that the creditor and borrower received were both equal to the going rate on three-month 9 As Bordo et al. (2010) The expansion of the swap lines was a natural consequence of both the mounting threat to the U.S. gold stock and the growing volume of international transactions, but the increasing length of swap drawings and the frequent tendency to renew them suggested that the underlying disequilibrium was more of a fundamental than a temporary nature.
Protecting the Gold Stock-the Swiss-Franc Example
Between 1962 In the 1960s, the U.K. pound was the second most widely held reserve currency, but observers questioned the viability of its par value because the United Kingdom's competitive position had deteriorated since the war's end and because the United Kingdom's reserve position seemed low relative to the country's growing balance-of-payments position (see Cairncross and Eichengreen, 2003) . By 1963, the value of outstanding claims on pounds exceeded the United Kingdom's foreign exchange reserves (Bordo et al. 2010, p.192 While drawing on its swap lines and other international credits, the United Kingdom failed to address its fundamental balance-of-payments problems and, therefore, failed to instill confidence in the pound (Coombs 1976, p.12 Creditors to the United Kingdom offered financing for the conversion of these balances, but not for the covering further balance-of-payments deficits. Moreover, they limited their loans to the amount of credits that the United Kingdom still held with the IMF.
In February 1966, the pound again fell below par, prompting renewed defense operations.
To signal confidence in the British intervention efforts, the United States made huge-$144.7 million equivalent-spot purchases of pounds in June and July. At the same time, however, the United States had to deliver $66.6 million worth of pounds to settle previous forward contracts.
In addition, to hide a huge $300 million Bank of England swap-line drawing on its weekly statement of operations, the Federal Reserve swapped $88.2 million worth of pounds for dollars for one day with the Treasury on the last day of the statement week (Desk Report 1967, p.10).
Pressure on the pound subsided in the summer, but foreign central banks were now extremely reluctant to supply further credits to the United Kingdom (Coombs 1976, pp. 138 -143) . The United States decided to shoulder a greater burden, and the Federal Reserve increased its entire swap facility-all currencies-from $2.8 billion to $4.5 billion. This included an 80 percent increase in the United Kingdom's swap line to $1,350 million. Underlying this multicurrency action was the fear that if the pound came under speculative attack, the dollars expended to support the pound very likely would end up in the portfolios of other central banks.
The Federal Reserve might then need to provide these banks with cover through swap drawings to protect the U.S. gold reserves (Coombs 1976, p. 141 ).
An increased demand for pounds followed the announced expansion of the swap lines and credit facilities as traders sought to cover short positions. Interest rates spreads subsequently began to favor pounds and the United States again engaged in market swaps to lower the forward discount on pounds. operations, and that the United States should take corrective actions to reduce the U.S. balanceof-payments deficit (FOMC Minutes 12 December 1967, pp.17 -19) . They viewed the U.S.
balance-of-payments problem as fundamental.
Other Uses Swaps-Eurodollar Intervention
The Almost all such drawings were repaid within a month, either at, or prior to, their maturity date. In practice, the size of foreign drawings, large as they have been at times, has not been more than the domestic trading desk could offset-for the most part
immediately-through open market operations. So long as the availability of the swap line is unconditional, the reserve consequences of foreign drawings are one of the operating factors that the Manager for domestic operations has to take into account in determining the size or direction of his own operations in any given day or week. They thus fall in the category of changes in Treasury cash balances, changes in float, and changes in currency in circulation. (McLaury 1969, p. 9 ).
The effect was no different than the normal, non-swap problems that the desk faces because of the dollar's reserve and vehicle currency status.
Swaps and the Collapse of Bretton Woods
Although much of the exchange-market turmoil during the late 1960s reflected the misalignment of cross-rates among foreign countries, notably the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, a new more profound threat to Bretton Woods-an accelerating U.S. inflation ratewas slowly taking precedence. These cross-rate problems did not directly reflect U.S. balanceof-payments developments and eventually terminated in revaluations. As they unfolded, however, inflation in the United States rose from below 2 percent in 1964 to above 6 percent by the end of 1969. By 1970, Bretton Woods faced an inflation-induced dollar crisis. The Nixon administration, however, shifted much of the blame, contending that the United States' major trading partners were deliberately discriminating against the United States. The administration adopted a position of "benign neglect" about the growing U.S. balance-of-payments deficit and the U.S. commitments to Bretton Woods (Coombs 1976, pp. 204 -211 As noted, swap obligations included revaluation clauses that protected a country initiating a swap drawing in case the creditor country revalued its currency. In such cases, the creditor country was to provide the debtor country sufficient funds at the pre-revaluation exchange rate to extinguish the drawing. The upward drift of many currencies against the dollar and the Smithsonian Agreement had created uncertainty as to whether, and to what extent, the dollar had been devalued or foreign currencies revalued. In 1972, the position emerged that a broad-based appreciation of foreign currencies against the dollar implied a dollar devaluation (FOMC Minutes 21 March 1973, p. 63) . Hence, the revaluation clauses did not legally apply, and the United States faced a substantial loss on its outstanding swap obligations.
The Federal Reserve did not have much difficulty in paying down its outstanding swap obligations in German marks and U.K. pounds. The desk had purchased marks and pounds in the market and also acquired marks from the Bundesbank in a sufficient amount to repay its swap obligations against these currencies in summer 1972.
The Federal Reserve, however, had difficulty extinguishing its Belgian and Swiss 
The Fundamental Lesson
The Federal Reserve's vast swap network formed the first line defense in U.S. efforts to forestall Treasury gold losses and to instill confidence in the Bretton Wood parity structure.
Although the operations sometimes became rather convoluted-with the United States and other countries extending maturities, expanding borrowing limits, and trading obligations in one currency to cover obligations in another-they often proved successful in buying time for more fundamental adjustment. But, as eventually became clear, the large industrialized countries were unwilling to pursue fundamental adjustment. In the end, they would not subordinate their domestic policy objectives-they ones most important to their electorates-to the rigors of fixed exchange rates. The United States would not depress real economic activity to achieve a real dollar depreciation, and surplus countries were unwilling to inflate their economies to achieve a real appreciation. Special Drawing Rights, Triffin's (1960) solution to his paradox, arrived too late to be of any use, and countries were unable and unwilling to bottle up financial flows.
Absent a political consensus for such fundamental adjustments, the Bretton Woods system could not remain credible. In that sense, the swap mechanism was a failure: it maintained an ultimately unsustainable arrangement, arguably making the inevitable adjustment more difficult.
